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Running head: MATERIALS RESEARCH AND SUPER BATTERIES 
MATTHEW N. EISLER* 
Materials Research, Super Batteries, and the Technopolitics of Electric Automobility 
 
ABSTRACT 
The protracted commercialization of battery electric passenger vehicles is often ascribed to the 
failure of the automobile industry to embrace the latest power sources. In this article, I argue that 
the pace of progress in this context was instead dictated largely by the ways researchers 
constructed metrics of power source performance. Such processes can in turn be seen as issuing 
from the conflicting agendas of academic, industrial, and state research. Knowledge of advanced 
power sources historically tended to be generated not in the automobile industry but in the 
research laboratories of allied industries and especially in state-funded academic networks. 
Notable in this regard was materials science and engineering, which exerted an important 
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epistemic influence on advanced power source and electric vehicle research and development. 
Materials researchers tended to select compounds for reactivity rather than safety and durability, 
giving rise to the idea of a super battery and leading them and others to treat power sources as 
essentially materials rather than parts of complex technological systems. This way of thinking 
prevented technologists from appreciating the physical limits of power sources in real-world 
applications, setting up crises of expectation at later stages of electric automobile research and 
development. In the gap between basic research and the exigencies of industrial technoscience, 
the imagined super-battery electric vehicle came to be mobilized for ends consonant with 
multiple entrenched interests. 
 
KEY WORDS: electric vehicle, fuel cell, lithium ion battery, materials sciences and engineering, 
science and technology policy, solid-state ionics 
 
Both popular and scholarly accounts tend to ascribe the long gestation of the modern electric 
passenger vehicle to the dilatory tactics of auto manufacturers, a sector often cast as a holdover 
from the golden age of heavy manufacturing. If the conspiratorial predilections of automakers 
have perhaps been overstated, this LQGXVWU\¶VDQWLSDWK\DQGFRRUGLQDWHGUHVLVWDQFHWRWHFKQRORJ\-
forcing legislation, above all, the CaliforQLD$LU5HVRXUFHV%RDUG¶V=HUR(PLVVLRQ9HKLFOH
mandate, have been well documented.1 One industry tactic, theorized the historian David A. 
                                                        
1 See, for example, Daniel Sperling, Future Drive: Electric Vehicles and Sustainable 
Transportation (Washington, DC: Island Press, 1995); Michael Shnayerson, The Car That 
Could: The InsidH6WRU\RI*0¶V5HYROXWLRQDU\(OHFWULF9HKLFOH (New York: Random House, 
1996); Jack Doyle, 7DNHQIRUD5LGH'HWURLW¶V%LJ7KUHHDQGWKH3ROLWLFVRI3ROOXWLRQ (New 
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Kirsch in 2000, was to conjure an imaginary super battery as a way of indefinitely delaying 
commercial production of electric vehicles.2 Indeed, the historical record indicates that many 
advanced power sources have had a difficult and protracted development.3 The chemist Johan 
Coetzer held that this was a consequence of the ways researchers defined performance, which 
prevented them from considering the physical limits of practical power sources in real-world 
applications. Writing in 1986 after a decade of work on the sodium metal chloride battery, he 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
<RUN)RXU:DOOV(LJKW:LQGRZV*XVWDYR&ROODQWHVDQG'DQLHO6SHUOLQJ³7KH2ULJLQRI 
&DOLIRUQLD¶V=HUR(PLVVLRQ9HKLFOH0DQGDWH´Transportation Research Part A: Policy and 
Practice 42, no. 10 (2008): 1302±13; Daniel Sperling and Deborah Gordon, Two Billion Cars: 
Driving Toward Sustainability (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009). 
2 David A. Kirsch, The Electric Vehicle and the Burden of History (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers 
University Press, 2000), on 206±07. 
3 7KHWHUP³DGYDQFHGSRZHUVRXUFH´JHQHUDOO\UHIHUVWREDWWHULHVWKDWDUHUHFKDUJHDEOHSRZHUIXO
(defined as the rate of energy flow per unit of volume), and energetic (defined as the amount of 
VWRUHGHQHUJ\SHUXQLWRIYROXPHRUPDVV%DWWHULHVDUHRIWHQFRQVLGHUHG³DGYDQFHG´LIWKH\
have energy densities greater than 30±40 watt hours per kilogram, the contemporary limits of 
classical battery chemistries such as lead-acid and nickel-cadmium. Notable advanced power 
sources include sodium sulfur, lithium titanium disulfide, sodium metal chloride, and lithium 
aluminum±metal sulfide batteries, as well as a range of fuel cells. See Chen-Xi Zu and Hong Li, 
³7KHUPRG\QDPLF$QDO\VLVRQ(QHUJ\'HQVLWLHVRI%DWWHULHV´Energy and Environmental 
Science 4 (2011): 2614±24, on 2615. 
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noted that electrochemical systems were often judged only by energy and power density, yet 
high cost and adverse safety characteristics often made them unviable.4  
.LUVFKDQG&RHW]HU¶VREVHUYDWLRQVFDOODWWHQWLRQWRcollaboration among the academy, 
state, and industry in constructing metrics of power source performance as a key determinant of 
the history of electric automobility. Quests for super batteries and their crises of expectation may 
be attributed largely to the belief that power sources were essentially materials rather than parts 
of complex technological systems.5 This belief can in turn be seen as a product of the conflicting 
agendas of academic, industrial, and state research. 
An important reason automakers were reluctant to produce electric vehicles at the turn of 
the twenty-first century is that few possessed significant in-house expertise in anything other 
than the venerable lead-acid battery, a technology they claimed could not meet consumer 
expectations. Knowledge relevant to advanced power sources usually tended to be generated 
elsewhere, sometimes in the research laboratories of allied industries and especially in state-
funded academic networks. Notably important in this regard was materials science and 
engineering (MSE). A boundary-straddling discipline originally built around metallurgy and, 
later, the study of ceramics and plastics, MSE was initiated by the federal government in the 
                                                        
4 -RKDQ&RHW]HU³$1HZ+LJK(QHUJ\'HQVLW\%DWWHU\6\VWHP´JPS 18, no. 4 (1986): 377±80, 
on 377.  
5 I referencHWKHDFWRU¶VFDWHJRU\RIPDWHULDO-as-device from Christophe Lécuyer and David C. 
%URFN¶Vstudy RIWKHHDUO\KLVWRU\RIVHPLFRQGXFWRUUHVHDUFKDQGGHYHORSPHQW6HH³The 
0DWHULDOLW\RI0LFURHOHFWURQLFV´ History and Technology 22, no. 3 (2006): 301±25, on 304.  
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wake of Sputnik on grounds that advanced materials constituted the basis of modern military and 
civilian industry.6  
The equivalence of materials, technology, and economic growth increasingly influenced 
thinking in federal science policy circles from the 1970s as the energy and environmental crises 
generated pressure for alternative energy/transportation systems.7 Working at a remove from the 
                                                        
6 For an exemplary history of MSE, see Bernadette Bensaude-9LQFHQW³7KH&RQVWUXFWLRQRID
'LVFLSOLQH0DWHULDOV6FLHQFHLQWKH8QLWHG6WDWHV´Historical Studies in the Physical and 
Biological Sciences 31, no. 2 (2001): 223-48. See also William O. BDNHU³$GYDQFHVLQ
0DWHULDOV5HVHDUFKDQG'HYHORSPHQW´LQAdvancing Materials Research, ed. Peter A. Psaras 
and H. Dale Langford (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1987), 3±22. 
7 For the historical progression of such thinking, see National Academy of Sciences, Committee 
on the Survey of Materials Science and Engineering, 0DWHULDOVDQG0DQ¶V1HHGV, vol. 1: The 
History, Scope, and Nature of Materials Science and Engineering (Washington, DC: National 
Academy of Sciences, 1975); National Research Council, Committee on Materials Science and 
Engineering, Materials Science and Engineering for the 1990s: Maintaining Competitiveness in 
the Age of Materials (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1989); National Research 
Council, Committee on Condensed-Matter and Materials Physics 2010, Condensed-Matter and 
Materials Physics: The Science of the World Around Us (Washington, DC: National Academies 
Press, 2007); National Science and Technology Council, Materials Genome Initiative for Global 
Competitiveness (Washington, DC: Executive Office of the President of the United States, 
2011).{{re yellow: Pls confirm that a committee of 2010 can publish something in 2007,? 
7KDW¶VKRZWKLVUHDGVWRPH.²yes, this one is tricky, but I have double-checked it. The 
author of the document is CCMMP 2010, and the doc was published in 2007; see 
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automobile sector, academic MSE researchers took energy and power to be the defining 
properties of batteries, in part because they were the traditional points of departure for battery 
technologists. Unlike improvements in safety and durability, improvements in energy and power 
could be quickly and dramatically demonstrated, thereby constituting valuable social capital for 
researchers beholden to demanding and fickle state and academic patrons. Quite naturally, and 
again emulating traditional practice, materials researchers sought powerful compounds as the 
means to this end. However, responsibility for integrating these components lay with industrial 
research communities with varying degrees of contact with automakers and often their own ideas 
about applications. Building practical power sources out of potent and volatile materials often 
proved difficult, and none of the resulting technologies could meet all the requirements of 
electric drive. 
In this article, I explore the influence of the materials-technology equation in power 
source and electric vehicle research and development through the intertwined careers of key 
materials researchers, especially John B. Goodenough and Michael Thackeray. They are often 
credited as the intellectual authors of the contemporary revival in electric vehicles, thanks to 
their contributions to the invention of at least three of the most important lithium ion battery 
compounds in use in the mid-2010s.8 Revising accounts of the work of Goodenough and 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
http://www.nap.edu/catalog/11967/condensed-matter-and-materials-physics-the-science-of-
the-world}} 
8 See Seth Fletcher, Bottled Lightning: Superbatteries, Electric Cars, and the New Lithium 
Economy (New York: Hill and Wang, 2011); ,QWHUQDWLRQDO%DWWHU\$VVRFLDWLRQ³6SHFLDO
6\PSRVLXPWR+RQRU0LFKDHO7KDFNHUD\´
http://congresses.icmab.es/iba2013/images/stories/PDF/mt.pdf (accessed 13 Oct 2014); 
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Thackeray by rooting them in the overlapped yet disjointed realms of academic, state, and 
industrial research illustrates the unintended consequences of institutional and geographical 
distance from the realities of application. In the gap between basic research and the exigencies of 
industrial technoscience, the imagined super-battery electric vehicle came to be mobilized for 
ends consonant with multiple entrenched interests.  
 
GENESIS OF SUPER-BATTERY TECHNOSCIENCE  
For most of the twentieth century, the history of the research, development, and production of 
power sources for electric automobiles tracked broader trends in industrial battery technoscience. 
In the years following the disappearance of electric cars and trucks from American and European 
public roads in the 1920s and 1930s, automakers followed the preference of battery 
manufacturers for cheap, proven chemistries. They deemed the lead-acid rechargeable sufficient 
for the auxiliary role of starting and lighting internal combustion engined automobiles. For 
decades afterward as a result, noted the historian Richard Schallenberg, civilian power source 
technoscience stagnated in the United States.9  
                                                                                                                                                                                  
University of Texas at Austin, ³87$XVWLQ¶V -RKQ%*RRGHQRXJK:LQV(QJLQHHULQJ¶V+LJKHVW
Honor for Pioneering Lithium-,RQ%DWWHU\´-DQ 
http://www.utexas.edu/news/2014/01/06/goodenough-wins-highest-engineering-honor/ (accessed 
13 Oct 2014). 
9 Richard H. Schallenberg, Bottled Energy: Electrical Engineering and the Evolution of 
Chemical Energy Storage (Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 1982). See also Ralph 
J. Brodd, Factors Affecting US Production Decisions: Why Are There No Volume Lithium-Ion 
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In the Cold War era, only U.S. state institutions were willing to fund and procure 
powerful advanced batteries, mainly for specialized military roles.10 Nevertheless, the emergence 
of the conjoined energy and environmental crises in the last quarter of the twentieth century 
periodically compelled civilian industry to experiment with electric traction. Sometimes these 
enterprises were given impetus by governmental regulatory interventions and often were linked 
with state-funded research networks. Thanks to the cyclic nature of petroleum markets and 
electoral politics, as well as disputes between industry and government over how best to 
configure sustainable energy systems, however, such projects generally lacked coordination and 
continuity.  
It was through academic and state MSE networks that Goodenough and Thackeray 
helped shape the field of advanced power VRXUFHV&ODLPVIRU*RRGHQRXJK¶VUROHLQWKHVH
developments rest on his status as a founder of solid-state ionics, the technoscience of moving, 
inserting, and storing ions inside solids without changing their fundamental structures. It is the 
branch of MSE relevant to lithium ion batteries. Unlike his contemporary Stanford Ovshinsky, 
often credited with inventing the landmark nickel metal hydride (NiMH) rechargeable battery, 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
Battery Manufacturers in the United States? (Working Paper 05-01, ATP Working Paper Series, 
2005).  
10 In this period, a number of U.S. federal agencies directly researched or supported research in 
specialized power sources, including the Army (nickel-zinc batteries, fuel cells), NASA 
(zinc/silver-oxide batteries, fuel cells, radioisotope thermoelectric generators, photovoltaic 
arrays), the Atomic Energy Commission and National Institutes of Health (radioisotope 
thermoelectric generators), and the Department of Energy (lithium-alloy/metal sulfide batteries 
and fuel cells).  
 9 
Goodenough was not a technologist, strictly speaking. Possessing a doctorate in theoretical solid-
state physics earned at the University of Chicago in 1952, he professed himself motivated by 
both materials design and basic questions of solid-state science.11 Over the years, Goodenough 
developed a research agenda and an interdisciplinary style of work based on solving problems 
arising from devices. Guided by what he referred to as ³HQJLQHHULQJWDUJHWV´KHGHVLJQHG
experiments for chemists to execute.12  
Such work sometimes brought Goodenough into contact with battery interests, including 
some linked with the electric automobile. When this happened, and because he straddled the 
boundaries of basic and applied science, he tended to focus not on complete power source 
systems but on materials for particular components, mainly electrodes.13 The first such episode 
had formative consequences for solid-state ionics and power source design. Goodenough spent 
his early career at Lincoln Laboratory, where he worked on projects of his own choosing, 
following his contribution to the ceramic memory unit for the Whirlwind II air defense computer 
as part of WKH$LU)RUFH¶V3URMHFW/LQFROQin the late 1950s. He had become an authority on the 
class of gem-like minerals known as spinels by the time the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) 
                                                        
11 John B. Goodenough, interview by Bernadette Bensaude-Vincent and Arne Hessenbruch, 
March 2001, Caltech Library, 
http://authors.library.caltech.edu/5456/1/hrst.mit.edu/hrs/materials/public/Goodenough/Goodeno
ugh_interview.htm (accessed 28 Jan 2015). 
12 John B. Goodenough, interview by author, Austin, Texas, 11 Jul 2013. 
13 Goodenough, Bensaude-Vincent and Hessenbruch interview (ref. 11). 
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seconded him to evaluate a battery utilizing such substances invented by members of the Ford 
Research Laboratories in the late 1960s.14 
Inverting the traditional battery configuration of liquid electrolytes and solid electrodes, 
-RVHSK7.XPPHUDQG1HLOO:HEHU¶VVRGLXm-sulfur system had serious practical problems 
relating to its volatile materials and high operating temperature of 350ºC. Foremost among these 
was how to maintain heat during shutdown to prevent the electrodes from freezing and the risk of 
explosion if their molten materials breached containment and contacted each other. In the late 
1960s, Ford had no plans to commercialize the technology.15 
Nevertheless, the sodium-sulfur battery aroused great scientific interest because it utilized 
a hitherto unknown property of its solid electrolyte, a prosaic ceramic known as beta-alumina. 
Commonly used as industrial furnace insulation, this material also efficiently conducted ions 
when applied in a power source. The historians Hervé Arribart and Bernadette Bensaude-Vincent 
held that the sodium-sulfur system stimulated study of the reversible insertion of ions inside 
solids, a major shift in thinking at a time when electrochemists believed that reactions occurred 
primarily on electrode surfaces in relation to liquid electrolytes.16 Goodenough reported that his 
                                                        
14 Goodenough, interview by author (ref. 12). 
15 Michael H. Westbrook, The Electric Car: Development and Future of Battery, Hybrid and 
Fuel-Cell Cars (London: The Institution of Electrical Engineers, 2001), 22±23, 67, 79±80. 
16 Hervé Arribart and Bernadette Bensaude-9LQFHQW³%HWD-$OXPLQD´)HE&DOWHFK
Library, http://authors.library.caltech.edu/5456/1/hrst.mit.edu/hrs/materials/public/Beta-
alumina.htm (accessed 12 Aug 2013).{{[a] 85/GLGQ¶WZRUNZLWK³)OHWFKHU ´DWWDFKHG
²  [b] Did you mean to include Fletcher from n.8 here?²yes, it is Fletcher from n.8, I 
should have cited it first to avoid snafu-ing the URL}} 
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investigation of sodium-sulfur technology led him to help bring about the convergence of solid-
state ionics and electrochemistry, introducing to him to associates including Robert A. Huggins 
of Stanford University and M. Stanley Whittingham of the Exxon Corporation, whose work 
would importantly influence his own.17 
 
OPPORTUNITY COSTS AND CONSEQUENCES 
The sudden rise in the cost of petroleum and increasing public awareness of environmental 
despoliation from the early 1970s provided economic and political incentives for industry and 
government to revisit electric automobility. In this period, the federal energy establishment 
underwent a major reorganization, resulting in the breakup of the AEC and the consolidation of 
all energy-related research and development in the Energy Research and Development 
Administration (ERDA) in 1974 and then the Department of Energy (DOE) in 1977. As these 
events unfolded, Goodenough began to consider power source technology, including work 
Whittingham performed with electric traction in mind.18  
Both researchers adopted a reductive approach, focusing on particular components. One 
problem that Goodenough considered involved the limitations of water-based electrolytes, the 
solvent into which ionic charge carriers are dissolved. Water decomposes into oxygen and 
hydrogen at 1.23 volts, limiting batteries employing aqueous electrolytes to relatively low power. 
Goodenough was attracted by the potential of a zirconia-based solid electrolyte as the basis of a 
fuel cell, a device that directly electro-oxidizes hydrogenous fuels.19 Ever since the invention of 
                                                        
17 Goodenough, interview by author (ref. 12).  
18 Goodenough, interview by Bensaude-Vincent and Hessenbruch (ref. 11). 
19 Goodenough, interview by author (ref. 12). 
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the fuel cell in the mid-nineteenth century, researchers had imagined the technology as a 
combination of heat engine and galvanic battery without their respective shortcomings.20  
In practice, most fuel cell systems proved complex and fragile, incapable of rapid power 
delivery and prone to damaging side reactions when using anything other than pure or nearly 
pure hydrogen. To be sure, the solid oxide fuel cell (SOFC) obviated the electrolysis problems 
experienced by low-temperature storage batteries using aqueous electrolytes. It was also capable 
of directly using the cheapest and dirtiest carbonaceous fuels, at least in theory. However, the 
SOFC had severe practical problems, including severe corrosion, owing to its extremely high 
operating temperature of around 1,000ºC. It was also totally unsuited for vehicular applications.  
Aware of the shortcomings of high-temperature electrochemical systems, Whittingham 
considered chemistries that operated at low temperature with nonaqueous electrolytes.21 In the 
1970s, he was employed by the research and engineering division of the Exxon Corporation, a 
company synonymous with the fossil fuel transportation order but with some interest in 
electrochemical technology, likely as a hedging strategy. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, the 
company (then Standard Oil of New Jersey, through its Esso Research and Engineering division) 
studied fuel cells in hopes of supplying specialized fuels in case the U.S. Army decided to adopt 
the technology for electric drive.22 As the price of petroleum skyrocketed from October 1973, 
                                                        
20 Matthew N. Eisler, Overpotential: Fuel Cells, Futurism, and the Making of a Power Panacea 
(New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2012). 
21 M. 6:KLWWLQJKDP³(OHFWULFDO(QHUJ\6WRUDJHDQG,QWHUFDODWLRQ&KHPLVWU\´Science (New 
Series) 192, no. 4244 (1976): 1126±27. 
22 ³3URSRVDOIRUWKH&RQWLQXDtion of Government Contract Research on Fuel Cells; Program 
Period-&DOHQGDU<HDU´-XO\(VVR5HVHDUFKDQG(QJLQHHULQJ&RPSDQ\%R[
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Exxon had to consider the possibility that automakers would be forced to commercialize 
electrics. In September 1976, Congress passed the Electric and Hybrid Vehicle Research, 
Development, and Demonstration Act, authorizing ERDA to promote electric vehicle 
technologies and demonstrate their commercial feasibility.23 Start-ups including Sebring-
Vanguard in the United States and Electraction in the United Kingdom were producing small 
batches of short-range city electrics well prior to this legislation, and most established 
automakers conducted experiments with electric drive in this period, all using lead-acid 
batteries.24  
It was in this context that Whittingham invented the lithium±titanium disulfide battery in 
1976. With this device he succeeded in demonstrating the insertion and extraction of lithium 
ions, a major milestone in power source technoscience.25 At the time, Whittingham suggested 
that he had developed a practical rechargeable battery, but this was not quite the case. In fact, he 
had focused his energies on the titanium disulfide cathode, pairing it with an interim test anode 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
AO 247-Esso Research and Engineering Company, 1958±1966 Official Correspondence Files²
Materials Sciences Office, Advanced Research Projects Agency, Accession Number 68-A-2658, 
Record Group 330, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, MD. 
23 Electric and Hybrid Vehicle Research, Development and Demonstration Act of 1976, Public 
Law 94-413, US Statutes at Large 90 (1976): 1260±72. 
24 Westbrook, The Electric Car (ref. 15), 24±25. 
25 -RKQ%*RRGHQRXJK³5HFKDUJHDEOH%DWWHULHV&KDOOHQJHV2OGDQG1HZ´Journal of Solid 
State Electrochemistry 16, no. 6 (2012): 2019±29, on 2022; John B. Goodenough and Youngsik 
.LP³&KDOOHQJHVIRU5HFKDUJHDEOH/L%DWWHULHV´Chemistry of Materials Review 22, no. 3 
(2010): 587±603, on 592. 
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made of metallic lithium, a dangerous combination when the cell was subject to repeated 
recharging.26 In such circumstances, recollected Goodenough, the lithium±titanium disulfide 
battery became an incendiary.27  
As with the sodium-sulfur battery, this failed technology would supply Goodenough with 
timely engineering targets. In 1976, the federal government suddenly transferred all of 
*RRGHQRXJK¶V IXHOFHOOUHVHDUFKWR(5'$:LWKKLVSURJUDPDW/LQFROQ/DERUDWRU\³GHDGLQLWV
WUDFNV´*RRGHQRXJKaccepted an offer from Oxford University to chair its Inorganic Chemistry 
Laboratory.28 In England, the physicist regained the latitude to research spinels and metal oxides 
on his terms. 
The story of how Goodenough helped invent the lithium cobalt oxide cathode as a 
consequence of his analysis of the lithium±titanium disulfide battery illustrates how his use of 
engineering targets informed his definition of power source performance. Goodenough reasoned 
                                                        
26 :KLWWLQJKDP³(OHFWULFDO(QHUJ\6WRUDJH´UHI 
27 Over time, lithium ions plated unevenly on the anode owing to the creatLRQRID³SDVVLYDWLRQ´
layer, an interaction between the lithium metal anode and the ethylene carbonate in the liquid 
electrolyte. Repeated cycling at high voltage promoted lithium dendrites (encrustations) that, as 
they grew between the electrodes, created a short circuit that often ignited the flammable 
HOHFWURO\WHVHH*RRGHQRXJKLQWHUYLHZE\DXWKRUUHI*RRGHQRXJK³5HFKDUJHDEOH
%DWWHULHV´DQG*RRGHQRXJKDQG.LP³&KDOOHQJHVIRU5HFKDUJHDEOH/L%DWWHULHV´UHI 
28 According to Goodenough, his new employers assumed that because he had headed a ceramics 
laboratory engaged in solid-state chemistry, he must have been a chemist. Goodenough claimed 
his success annoyed English inorganic chemists who had coveted the position. See Goodenough, 
interview by author (ref. 12). 
 15 
that a layered sulfide cathode mated to a metallic lithium anode could yield no more than 2.5 
volts. Using a safer anode, he recalled, would have lowered voltage to the point that the device 
would not have been competitive with existing rechargeables using nonflammable aqueous 
electrolytes. An abstraction in this context, given that Goodenough seems to have had no 
intention of designing a complete battery for a specific application, this comparison privileged 
the quality of power over safety, cost, and durability.  
Thusly motivated, Goodenough looked to oxides. He devised an experiment to establish 
how much lithium could be reversibly extracted from cathodes made of layered lithium nickel 
and lithium cobalt oxides. He and his team showed that about 60 percent could be reversibly 
extracted from the latter when paired with a metallic lithium anode, generating 4 volts. They 
extracted even more (80 percent) from the nickel compound, but this material was unstable and 
difficult to prepare.29 
*RRGHQRXJKDQG:KLWWLQJKDP¶V approach to basic science as an early-stage process of 
technology development had important unintended consequences, both professionally and for the 
future of lithium ion battery and electric vehicle development. Despite his stated interest in basic 
research, Goodenough wanted to sell his component. But battery manufacturers were not 
interested for lack of a suitable, safe anode. With little money despite support from the European 
Energy Commission²and, interestingly, the United States Air Force, which continued to fund 
                                                        
29 6HH*RRGHQRXJK³5HFKDUJHDEOH%DWWHULHV´UHIDQGLQWHUYLHZE\DXWKRUUHI6HH
also K. Mizushima, P. C. Jones, P. J. Wiseman, and J. %*RRGHQRXJK³/LxCoO2: A New 
&DWKRGH0DWHULDOIRU%DWWHULHVRI+LJK(QHUJ\'HQVLW\´MRB 15, no. 6 (1980): 783±89; J. B. 
*RRGHQRXJK.0L]XVKLPDDQG77DNHGD³6ROLG-Solution Oxides for Storage-Battery 
(OHFWURGHV´Japanese Journal of Applied Physics 19 (1980): 305±13. 
 16 
his work at Oxford²Goodenough patented through the United Kingdom¶V$WRPLF(QHUJ\
Research Establishment (AERE).30  
Goodenough had to relinquish all his rights in an arrangement that haunted him in later 
years. Lithium cobalt oxide was not ideal for commercial electric drive, not least because cobalt 
was too expensive in the quantities this role called for. But the chemistry was suited for 
FRQVXPHUHOHFWURQLFV)URP6RQ\¶V(QHUJ\WHFGLYLVLRQVRXJKWWRLQWHJUDWHWKHOLWKLXP
cobalt oxide cathode with a graphitic anode in a project to replace the nickel-cadmium battery, 
one that owed a good deal to the contributions of Akira Yoshino and the Asahi Kasei 
Corporation.31 Licensing generated vast royalties for AERE, of which Goodenough received 
nothing. Nevertheless, *RRGHQRXJK¶V work on battery materials helped him become perhaps the 
ZRUOG¶VIRUHPRVWH[SHUWRn spinels and lithium insertion compounds. In the early 1980s, 
Goodenough attracted the attention of Michael Thackeray, a young South African chemist whose 
search for a better batWHU\IRUHOHFWULFDXWRPRELOHVZRXOGEHFRPHKLVOLIH¶VZRUN 
 
ENGINEERING TARGETS IN AN ERA OF ENERGY PLENITUDE 
                                                        
30 See Goodenough, interview by author (ref. 12); Fletcher, Bottled Lightning (ref. 8).  
31 *RRGHQRXJK³5HFKDUJHDEOH%DWWHULHV´UHI<RVKLR1LVKL³0\Way to Lithium-Ion 
%DWWHULHV´DQG0DVDNL<RVKLR$NL\D.R]DZDDQG5DOSK-%URGG ³Introduction: Development 
of Lithium-,RQ%DWWHULHV´LQLithium-Ion Batteries: Science and Technologies, ed. Masaki 
Yoshio, Ralph J. Brodd, and Akiya Kozawa (Springer: New York, 2009), v±vii, xvii±xxvi; 
.D]XQRUL2]DZD³Lithium-Ion Rechargeable Batteries with LiCoO2 and Carbon Electrodes: The 
LiCoO2&6\VWHP´ SSI 69, nos. 3±4 (1994): 212±21, on 212. 
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For proponents of the electric automobile, the return to cheap oil in most of the developed world 
from the early 1980s deprived them of an important justification. The Reagan administration was 
hostile to alternative energy technologies, although not as uniformly as sometimes suggested. It 
did not support renewable energy.32 However, the DOE (the successor of ERDA) did invest in 
high-temperature electrochemical devices, both fuel cells (which had political cover owing to 
their theoretical ability to use common carbonaceous fuels), and lithium batteries. Although these 
programs did not ignore electric traction, they emphasized stationary power systems.33  
                                                        
32 'DYLG%LHOOR³:KHUH'LGWKH&DUWHU:KLWH+RXVH¶V6RODU3DQHOV*R"´Scientific American, 6 
Aug 2010, http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/carter-white-house-solar-panel-array/ 
(accessed 5 Mar 2014). 
33 For a brief history of ArgoQQH1DWLRQDO/DERUDWRU\¶VLQYROYHPHQWZLWKKRWOLWKLXPSRZHU
sources, see G. L. Henriksen and D. R. Vissers, ³/LWKLXP-$OXPLQXP,URQ6XOILGH%DWWHULHV´JPS 
51, nos. 1±2 (1994): 115±28. ,QWKLVSHULRGWKH'HSDUWPHQWRI(QHUJ\¶V2IILFHRI)RVVLO(QHUJ\
extended a good deal of aid to the United Technologies Corporation in a project to 
commercialize phosphoric acid fuel cells. See U.S. Department of Energy, Onsite 40-Kilowatt 
Fuel Cell Power Plant Manufacturing and Field Test Program (Washington, DC: U.S. 
Department of Energy, 1985), 1±1, 1±2, 2±4; A. J. Appleby and F. R. Foulkes, Fuel Cell 
Handbook (New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1989). From around 1980, the DOE also began 
to support electric vehicle demonstration programs. See J. Byron McCormick and James R. Huff, 
³7KH&DVHIRU)XHO-Cell-3RZHUHG9HKLFOHV´Technology Review (Aug/Sept 1980): 54±65; D. A. 
)UHLZDOGDQG:-%DUDWWLQR³$OWHUQDWLYH7UDQVSRUWDWLRQ9HKLFOHVIRU0LOLWDU\-Base 
2SHUDWLRQV´International Journal of Hydrogen Energy 6, no. 6 (1981): 631±36; Pandit G. Patil, 
³3URVSHFWVIRU(OHFWULF9HKLFOHV´IEEE AES Systems Magazine 5, no. 12 (1990): 15±19.  
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Conditions in South Africa, however, were importantly different. There the energy crisis 
had severe long-WHUPHIIHFWVFRPSRXQGHGE\WKHFRXQWU\¶VJURZLQJSROLWLFDODQGHFRQRPLF
isolation.34 In response, policy makers linked national science institutions with a semi-autarkic 
industrial policy emphasizing energy and transportation.35 From around 1977 and for the next 
fifteen \HDUVWKHVHFRQVLGHUDWLRQVGURYHHIIRUWVE\6RXWK$IULFD¶VCouncil for Scientific and 
Industrial Research (CSIR) to develop commercial electric vehicle batteries in the so-called 
ZEBRA project. 
As a doctoral student of Johan Coetzer at the National Physical Research Laboratory in 
Pretoria in the mid-1970s, Thackeray, like Whittingham, had begun his career investigating 
materials problems of high-temperature advanced batteries. As Coetzer searched for alternative 
electrodes for the lithium aluminum-iron sulfide battery then being researched at Argonne 
National Laboratory, Thackeray contemplated metal oxides. He believed iron oxides were less 
corrosive than both $UJRQQH¶VLURQVXOILGHFDWKRGHand the iron chloride electrode Coetzer had 
considered as a possible replacement. Attention at CSIR then shifted to sodium-metal chloride 
                                                        
34 Barbara Rogers has pointed out the often-overlooked breadth of the 1973 oil embargo. 
&RRUGLQDWLQJZLWKWKHQRQDOLJQHGPRYHPHQW23(&¶V$rab states targeted not only Western 
allies of Israel, but South Africa, Rhodesia, and Portugal as well. Waxy Angolan and 
Mozambiquan oil was considered unsuited for South African refineries and was in any case 
largely contractually obligated to Gulf Oil. 6HH³6RXWKHUQ$IULFDDQGWKH2LO(PEDUJR´Africa 
Today 21, no. 2 (1974): 3±8. 
35 D. G. Kingwill, The CSIR: The First 40 Years (Pretoria: CSIR, 1990), 6±9, 32. 
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chemistries utilizing beta-alumina as the electrolyte. It was in the course of this project that 
Thackeray noted the potential of certain spinels to absorb and release lithium ions.36  
With this realization, Thackeray made contact with Goodenough at Oxford and arranged 
to work with him as a postdoctoral fellow. Supported by the CSIR, its affiliated South African 
Inventions Development Corporation (SAIDCOR), and mining giant Anglo American, 
Thackeray demonstrated the insertion of lithium into magnetite and another spinel known as 
hausmannite bHWZHHQWKHIDOORIDQGWKHHQGRI7KLVZRUNLQIRUPHG7KDFNHUD\¶V
subsequent demonstration of lithium insertion and extraction in a lithium manganese oxide 
cathode.37 In 1985, Goodenough and Thackeray patented their work (assigned to SAIDCOR) on 
the metal oxide spinel frameworks for use as battery components.38 
 The knowledge that these materials provided three-dimensional interstitial space for 
mobile lithium ions did not have immediate practical consequences. Sony conducted research on 
                                                        
36 0LFKDHO7KDFNHUD\³*ROGHQ<HDUVRI%DWWHU\5	'DW&6,5±´South African 
Journal of Chemistry 64 (2011): 61±66, on 63. 
37 7KDFNHUD\DQG*RRGHQRXJK¶VZRUNDURXVHGVRPHLQWHUHVWLQVWDWHUHVHDUFKDQGGHYHORSPHQW
circles. In addition to SAIDCOR, the researchers had financial support from the United States 
Air Force Office of Scientific Research, the Commission of European Economic Communities, 
the U.K. Ministry of Defense, and the Admiralty Marine Technology Establishment. See M. M. 
Thackeray, W.I.F. David, and J. %*RRGHQRXJK³6WUXFWXUDO&KDUDFWHUL]DWLRQRIWKH/LWKLDWHG
Iron Oxides LixFe3O4 and LixFe2O3´MRB 17, no. 6 (1982): 785±93; M. M. Thackeray, W.I.F. 
David, P. G. Bruce, and J. %*RRGHQRXJK³/LWKLXP,QVHUWLRQLQWR0DQJDQHVH6SLQHOV´MRB 
18, no. 4 (1983): 461±72. 
38 *RRGHQRXJK³5HFKDUJHDEOH%DWWHULHV´UHI7KDFNHUD\³*ROGHQ<HDUV´UHI 
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lithium manganese oxide and lithium nickel oxide chemistries before choosing lithium cobalt 
oxide.39 On his return to South Africa, Thackeray set up a group to explore the properties of 
metal oxide electrodes in room-temperature lithium cells. In the succeeding years, however, the 
ZEBRA project seems to have absorbed much of his energy.40 In 1986, with basic research 
completed, the CSIR transferred sodium metal chloride technology, and most of its staff, to 
Anglo American. Shortly thereafter, the mining firm partnered with Daimler-Benz, which began 
testing sodium nickel chloride batteries in electric vehicles.41  
 
ON THE THRESHOLD OF A SALTATION 
The agenda of the German automaker was less straightforward than its partners. Daimler-Benz 
had long experimented with alternative propulsion systems for a variety of reasons including, by 
                                                        
39 Sony preferred lithium cobalt oxide because it offered superior cycling, discharge capacity, 
and charge/discharge efficiency (at the cost of lower stability and voltage) than lithium 
manganese oxide, and had higher voltage, better charge/discharge efficiency, and better stability 
and cycling than lithium nickel oxide at the cost of lower discharge capacity. See Yoshio Nishi, 
³/LWKLXP,RQ6HFRQGDU\%DWWHULHV3DVW<HDUVDQGWKH)XWXUH´JPS 100, nos. 1±2 (2001): 
101±06, on 102. 
40 0RVWRI7KDFNHUD\¶VNH\SDSHUVDQGSDWHQWVIRUOLWKLXPPDQJDQHVHV\VWHPVGDWHIURPWKH
HDUO\V6HH³*ROGHQ<HDUV´UHI 
41 J. /6XGZRUWK³=HEUD%DWWHULHV´ JPS 51, nos. 1±2 (1994): 105±14; 7KDFNHUD\³*ROGHQ
<HDUV´UHI 
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the 1970s, public relations at a time of rising environmental consciousness.42 By the late 1980s 
and early 1990s, Daimler-Benz had become interested in another advanced power source, the 
proton exchange membrane (PEM) fuel cell developed by a little-known Canadian R&D start-up 
known as Ballard Power Systems.43  
In general, however, interest in super-battery electric vehicles (BEVs) remained tepid 
through the 1980s. Power sources no longer supplied *RRGHQRXJK¶Vprimary engineering targets, 
and his interests in this period were eclectic.44 His ascribed his role in the discovery of lithium 
iron phosphate, the last of the three lithium insertion compounds he had a hand in creating, as 
motivated by fundamental curiosity in three-dimensional, sodium ion± conducting structures.45  
                                                        
42 See Peter Hoffmann, The Forever Fuel: The Story of Hydrogen (Boulder, CO: Westview 
3UHVV+HOPXW%XFKQHU³7KH+\GURJHQ+\GULGH(QHUJ\&RQFHSW´International Journal 
of Hydrogen Energy 3, no. 4 (1978): 385±+HOPXW%XFKQHUDQG53RYHO³7KH'DLPler-
%HQ]+\GULGH9HKLFOH3URMHFW´International Journal of Hydrogen Energy 7, no. 3 (1982): 259±
66. 
43 Tom Koppel, Powering the Future: The Ballard Fuel Cell and the Race to Change the World 
(Toronto: John Wiley & Sons Canada, 1999), 115±16. 
44 In 1986, Goodenough and his postdoctoral fellow Arumugam Manthiram decamped Oxford 
for the Center for Materials Science and Engineering at the University of Texas at Austin. There 
they succeeded in inducing high-temperature superconductivity in a copper oxide material in 




On the other hand, Thackeray and his coZRUNHUVDWWKH&6,5¶V'LYLVLRQRI0DWHULDOV
Science and Technology made a series of improvements to lithium manganese oxide electrodes 
in the early 1990s with practical power sources very much in mind, even as South African 
government support waned for a lack of industrial interest. With apparently limited means, 
7KDFNHUD\¶VWHDPPDQDJHGWRVWDELOL]HWhe four-volt lithium manganese oxide cathode, which 
experienced structural distortions under conditions of deep discharge, by doping it with a variety 
of metals. They also developed a spinel anode (lithium±titanium oxide) suitable for the stabilized 
cathode.46 In 1992, the CSIR left the field entirely, and in January 1994, Thackeray accepted a 
position at the Chemical Technology Division of Argonne National Laboratory, where he 
performed some of this work. 
 
DEFINING THE ZERO-EMISSION AUTOMOBILE 
In the 1990s, regional air quality politics triggered a major resurgence of interest in electric 
drive. In its Zero Emission Vehicle (ZEV) mandate, part of a larger Low Emission Vehicle 
program created in 1990, the California Air Resources Board (CARB) created a fertile 
environment for materials approaches to power source research and development, and for super-
battery ideation as a key element in the ensuing technopolitics of alternative automobility. On its 
face, the mandate promised to revolutionize the ways industry built and marketed automobiles. It 
required automakers with the largest shares of the California market (the seven major American 
                                                        
46 R. J. Gummow, A. de Kock, and M. 07KDFNHUD\³,PSURYHG&DSDFLW\5HWHQWLRQLQ
Rechargeable 4V Lithium/Lithium-0DQJDQHVH2[LGH6SLQHO&HOOV´SSI 69, no. 1 (1994): 59±
67; E. Ferg, R. J. Gummow, A. de Kock, and M. 07KDFNHUD\³6SLQHO$QRGHVIRU/LWKLXP-Ion 
%DWWHULHV´Journal of the Electrochemical Society 141, no. 11 (1994): L147±50. 
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and Japanese companies) to produce a rolling quota of ZEVs as a percentage of overall sales: 
2 percent in 1998, 5 percent in 2001, and 10 percent in 2003 and subsequent model years.47  
Yet the mandate was ambiguous, for CARB could only specify air quality outcomes, not 
the technologies that would achieve them. The result was a protracted negotiation on the 
definition of a ZEV, one in which state research and development agencies played an important 
role. A number of scholars concur that CARB drew inspiration for the mandate from the Impact, 
a lead-acid concept BEV developed by General Motors, which the compaQ\¶VFKLHIHxecutive 
officer, Roger Smith, suggested might be commercially produced.48  
But automakers were unanimously opposed to the legislated production of BEVs. They 
considered existing batteries inadequate and sought to convince CARB and the federal 
government that a commercial lead-acid BEV would be a market fiasco. They also supported 
advanced power source research and development. With the help of the DOE, American 
automakers formed the United States Advanced Battery Consortium (USABC) in 1991 to 
coordinate public and private work to this end.49 The White House reinforced the industry 
agenda with its Partnership for a New Generation of Vehicles (PNGV). Launched in 1993, this 
collaborative research and development program was intended to encourage American 
automakers to develop non-BEV advanced technologies, especially the hybrid electric vehicle 
                                                        
47 CARB³3URSRVHG5HJXODWLRQVIRU/RZ-Emissions Vehicles and Clean Fuels: Technical 
6XSSRUW'RFXPHQW´$XJ 
48 See Shnayerson, The Car That Could (ref. 1); Doyle, Taken for a Ride (ref. 1); Collantes and 
6SHUOLQJ³7KH2ULJLQRI&DOLIRUQLD¶V=HUR(PLVVLRQ9HKLFOH0DQGDWH´UHI 1); Sperling, Future 
Drive (ref. 1). 
49 ³$XWR0DNHUVLQ%DWWHU\3ODQ´The New York Times, 1 Feb 1991. 
 24 
(HEV), as a substitute for technology-forcing legislation like the Corporate Average Fuel 
Economy.50  
Hybrid electric drive implied that practical electric automobility could only be realized by 
coupling extant less-than-super batteries with existing (internal combustion) and experimental 
(fuel cell) power plants. If the global auto industry was of one mind where the BEV was 
concerned, it was not so united on the question of the HEV. To a degree, this divergence 
reflected distinct national approaches to industrial research, development, and production. Like 
U.S. IHGHUDODJHQFLHV-DSDQ¶V0LQLVWU\RI,QWHUQDWLRQDO7UDGHDQG,QGXVWU\0,7I) had supported 
BEV research and development since the 1970s. To be sure, MITI played a much more overt role 
coordinating industrial planning, but the automobile sector was an important exception. More 
independent than other parts of the Japanese economy, LWUHMHFWHG0,7,¶VLQLWLDWLYHV51  
It is ironic, then, that Japanese automakers found themselves subject to state-backed, 
technology-forcing measures in the United States, a society nominally committed to free market 
                                                        
50 %UHQW'<DFREXFFL³7KH3DUWQHUVKLSIRUD1HZ*HQHUDWLRQRI9HKLFOHV6WDWXVDQG,VVXHV´
Congressional Research Service Report RS20852, 22 Jan 2003, 
http://wikileaks.org/wiki/CRS-20852 (accessed 2 Feb 2009).{{URL no longer yields functional 
page. Do you have another URL for this source? ²if you pop this URL into Google, it links 
to a Wikileaks site, where a PDF of the report can be downloaded; I¶YHLQFOXGHGWKH85/
for the site: 
https://wikileaks.org/wiki/CRS:_The_Partnership_for_a_New_Generation_of_Vehicles:_St
atus_and_Issues,_January_22,_2003}} 
51 Max Åhman, ³Government Policy and the DevHORSPHQWRI(OHFWULF9HKLFOHVLQ-DSDQ´
Energy Policy 34, no. 4 (2006): 433±43, on 435, 439. 
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SULQFLSOHV)DFLQJ&DOLIRUQLD¶V=(9PDQdate, they warmed to the HEV as a less risky industrial 
response to U.S. environmental politics. In the wake of the PNGV, which was restricted to 
American manufacturers, and independently of MITI, Honda and Toyota initiated hybrid electric 
projects in the early 1990s. They looked to the NiMH battery, technology pioneered by Stanford 
Ovshinsky with the aid of a USABC grant and intended for use in a pure BEV. Ovshinsky used 
relatively cheap and safe materials, including an aqueous, nonflammable electrolyte, to achieve 
energy density of up to 80 watt hours per kilogram, considerably higher than the 30±40 watt 
hours per kilogram of the best lead-acid traction batteries of the day.52  
Toyota adopted NiMH technology in a relatively short time. Having no expertise with 
prime mover electrochemical systems, like all automakers, it partnered with Matsushita, creating 
the joint venture Panasonic EV Energy in 1996. One year later, this enterprise introduced a 
cylindrical NiMH battery for the Prius passenger automobile.53 Although MITI had not initiated 
the HEV projects, the analyst Max Åhman argued that the ministry nevertheless played an 
important supporting role by transferring to industry drive train and power source technology 
derived from its BEV effort.54 
                                                        
52 S. R. Ovshinsky, M. $)HWFHQNRDQG-5RVV³$1LFNHO0HWDO+\GULGH%DWWHU\IRU(OHFWULF
9HKLFOHV´Science (New Series) 260, no. 5105 (1993): 176±81; Zu anG/L³7KHUPRG\QDPLF
$QDO\VLV´ref. 3). 
53 See Yasuyuki Motoyama, Global Companies, Local Innovations: Why the Engineering 
Aspects of Innovation-Making Require Co-Location (Surrey, UK: Ashgate, 2012), 59±64; 
Akihiro Taniguchi, Noriyuki Fujioka, Munehisa INRPDDQG$NLUD2KWD³'HYHORSPHQWRI
Nickel/Metal-+\GULGH%DWWHULHVIRU(9VDQG+(9V´JPS 100, nos. 1±2 (2001): 117±24. 
54 Åhman, ³*RYHUQPHQW3ROLF\´UHI 
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,QFRQWUDVW'HWURLW¶VDSSURDFKWRWKHK\EULGHOHFWULFWKURXJKWKH31*9ZDVWRtreat it as 
a kind of supercar. The industry-government partnership insisted that the HEV battery have two 
operating modes: power assist and pure electric. The former required only a battery of high 
power and modest energy, since the average depth of discharge would be comparatively shallow, 
depending on whether the battery was coupled to a prime mover that responded quickly (internal 
combustion) or slowly (fuel cell) to demands for power. The dual-mode hybrid electric, on the 
other hand, required a larger battery that had high power and energy and that was robust enough 
to deep-discharge repeatedly in providing electric-only transport.55  
With this decision, planners contradicted the premise of the hybrid electric as an interim 
technology. In essence, the dual-mode HEV was a near-BEV, a second-generation hybrid 
requiring precisely the super battery that U.S. industry insisted could not be quickly developed 
for the pure BEV, at a time when Japanese manufacturers were well on their way to 
commercializing a first-generation hybrid electric using first-generation NiMH technology. The 
PNGV identified NiMH and lithium-ion as the two candidate chemistries for this role, making 
)UDQFH¶V6$)7WKHVROHFRQWUDFWRUIRUthe latter. The contractor selected lithium nickel oxide on 
grounds of high power and energy, good cycle life, and low cost.56 
                                                        
55 0LFKDHO6DIW*X\&KDJQRQ7KLHUU\)DXJHUDV*X\6DUUHDQG3LHUUH0RUKHW³6DIW/LWKLXP-
IRQ(QHUJ\DQG3RZHU6WRUDJH7HFKQRORJ\´JPS 80, nos. 1±2 (1999): 180±89, on 185. 
56 National Research Council, Review of the Research Program of the Partnership for a New 
Generation of Vehicles: Third Report (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1997), 71±73; 
M. Broussely, J. 33ODQFKDW*5LJREHUW'9LUH\DQG*6DUUH³/LWKLXP-Ion Batteries for 
(OHFWULF9HKLFOHV3HUIRUPDQFHVRI$K&HOOV´JPS 68, no. 1 (1997): 8±12; M. Broussely, 
³5HFHQW'HYHORSPHQWVRQ/LWKLXP,RQ%DWWHULHVDW6$)7´JPS 81±82 (1999): 140±43, on 141. 
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But in longer-term tests of individual lithium nickel oxide cells, SAFT could not meet 
cycle-life targets. Perhaps SUHGLFWDEO\HQRXJKJLYHQ*RRGHQRXJK¶VH[SHULHQFHVthese tests 
revealed that the compound became dangerously unstable as it aged, resulting in some cases in 
cell combustion.57 Researchers had rediscovered the dangers of electrode interaction with 
flammable organic electrolytes in abuse conditions such as overcharge, overdischarge, and 
vibration.  
Because the PNGV partners agreed that adopting a new chemistry was akin to starting 
from scratch, the DOE created the Advanced Technology Development (ATD) program in 1998 
to support manufacturers in characterizing the failure mechanisms of lithium nickel oxide.58 
Teams of researchers worked to correct the compound¶Vinherent instability using a variety of 
ordering elements that kept nickel in the nickel layer, including cobalt, cobalt and aluminum, 
manganese and cobalt, and nickel-cobalt-aluminum (NCA). In the following decade, the ATD 
                                                        
57 National Research Council, Review of the Research Program of the Partnership for a New 
Generation of Vehicles: Fourth Report (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1998), 43±
44; National Research Council, Review of the Research Program of the Partnership for a New 
Generation of Vehicles: Fifth Report (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1999), 7, 38±
39. 
58 Raymond A. Sutula, Progress Report for the Advanced Technology Development Program 
(Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Energy, 2000). Although the ATD program was designed 
to aid U.S. battery manufacturers, many PNGV subcontractors were foreign and ATD 
researchers depended heavily on materials and cathode chemistries developed by Japanese firms 
such as Fuji and Hitachi. 
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would constitute an important part of the federal advanced battery program.59 It also influenced 
Panasonic in its efforts to develop the NCA battery, a technology the Japanese firm would 
produce for the Tesla Motors Model S luxury BEV from 2012.60 
 
PERFECTING THE ENEMIES OF THE GOOD 
Even prior to this initiative, PNGV planners were becoming enamored with another super power 
source as the basis of the ultimate ZEV. This was the proton exchange membrane (PEM) fuel 
cell. A low-temperature (below 100°C) design that utilized a polymer electrolyte and a platinum-
laced anode, it seemed to offer a number of advantages over conventional storage battery 
technology. Citing rapid improvements in the current density of PEM fuel cells in the 1990s, 
developers held that the technology reconciled high-performance electric drive with political and 
economic realities. Electric vehicles equipped with fuel cells, they claimed, would have much 
                                                        
59 6HHIRUH[DPSOH.$PLQHHWDO³)DFWRUV5HVSRQVLEOHIRU,PSHGDQFH5LVHLQ+LJK3RZHU
/LWKLXP,RQ%DWWHULHV´JPS 97±98 (2001): 684±87; R. %:ULJKWHWDO³&DOHQGDU- and Cycle-
Life Studies of Advanced Technology Development Program Generation 1 Lithium-Ion 
%DWWHULHV´JPS 110, no. 2 (2002): 445±,%ORRPHWDO³(IIHFWRI&DWKRGH&RPSRVLWLRQRQ
Capacity Fade, Impedance Rise, and Power Fade in High-Power Lithium-,RQ&HOOV´JPS 124, 
no. 2 (2003): 538±50; D. 3$EUDKDPHWDO³3HUIRUPDQFe Degradation of High-Power Lithium-
,RQ&HOOV(OHFWURFKHPLVWU\RI+DUYHVWHG(OHFWURGHV´JPS 170, no. 2 (2007): 465±75. 
60 Shoichiro Watanabe, Masahiro Kinoshita, and Kensuke Nakura, ³Capacity Fade of LiNi(1-x-
y)CoxAlyO2 Cathode for Lithium-Ion Batteries During Accelerated Calendar and Cycle Life Test. 
I. Comparison Analysis Between LiNi(1-x-y)CoxAlyO2 and LiCoO2 Cathodes in Cylindrical 
Lithium-,RQ&HOOV'XULQJ/RQJ7HUP6WRUDJH7HVW´JPS 247 (2014): 412±22. 
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longer range and offer greater convenience than battery electrics because they would use 
common liquid fuels stored in conventional tanks. In this manner, fossil fuel infrastructure would 
be made sustainable.61  
Such were the claims, at any rate, for fuel cell power. Beginning in early 1996, in 
response to heavy pressure from automakers, CARB modified the ZEV mandate accordingly. In 
exchange for an industry promise for early deployment of a much smaller number of BEVs, the 
air quality regulator eliminated its quotas from 1998 to 2002 and began to identify non-BEV 
technologies for which automakers could gain partial ZEV credit, including the dual-mode 
hybrid electric and the methanol fuel cell electric vehicle.62 From 1997, PNGV spending on fuel 
cells grew rapidly, supplanting hybrid V\VWHPVDVWKH'2(¶VWRSSULRULW\ in the partnership by 
mid-1998.63 Japanese automakers also began their own fuel cell electric research and 
development programs in this period. 
,QHIIHFWWKHIXHOFHOOHOHFWULFKDGEHFRPHWKH31*9¶VSROLWLFDOO\FRUUHFWK\EULGHOHFWULF. 
In the late 1990s, however, mounting problems with carbonaceous fuel cell systems, notably the 
                                                        
61 Between 1989 and 1997, Ballard Power Systems dramatically boosted fuel cell current density 
from 85 to 1200 watts per liter, after which progress quickly plateaued. See Charles Stone and 
$QQH(0RUULVRQ³)URP&XULRVLW\WRµ3RZHUWR&KDQJHWKH:RUOG¶´SSI 152±53 (2002): 1±
13, on 7±8. 
62 Deborah Salon, Daniel Sperling, and David Friedman, &DOLIRUQLD¶V3DUWLDO=(9&UHGLWVDQG
LEV II Program (Davis, CA: Research Report UCD-ITS-RR-99-14, Institute of Transportation 
Studies, 1999), 4±8. 
63 National Research Council, Review of the Research Program of the Partnership for a New 
Generation of Vehicles: Sixth Report (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 2000), 76. 
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inability of on-board converters to quickly crack gasoline or methanol into hydrogen, led 
government and industry researchers to focus on pure hydrogen fuel cell systems.64 These 
technologies were the chief preoccupation of FreedomCAR, the successor of the PNGV during 
the George W. Bush administration.65 
If the idea of the hydrogen fuel cell vehicle helped kill the pure BEV, as some critics 
suggested, it did not stop the proliferation of HEVs powered by NiMH batteries.66 As hybrid 
electrics became a familiar sight on U.S. roads, American manufacturers and the federal 
government belatedly realized there was in fact a lucrative market for the technology. In 2006, 
General Motors initiated the Chevrolet Volt project in what the FRPSDQ\¶VYLFH-chair Robert 
/XW]FKDUDFWHUL]HGDVDUHVSRQVHWRWKHFRPPHUFLDOVXFFHVVRI7R\RWD¶V3ULXVDQG the emergence 
                                                        
64 Christopher E. Borroni-%LUG³)XHO&HOO&RPPHUFLDOL]DWLRQ,VVXHVIRU/LJKW-Duty Vehicle 
$SSOLFDWLRQV´JPS 61, nos. 1±2 (1996): 33±48, oQ5LFKDUG.6WREDUW³)XHO&HOO3RZHUIRU
3DVVHQJHU&DUV:KDW%DUULHUV5HPDLQ"´LQFuel Cell Technology for Vehicles, ed. Richard 
Stobart (Warrendale, PA: Society of Automotive Engineers, 2001), 14. 
65 -HIIUH\%DOO³%XVK6KLIWV*HDUVRQ&DU5HVHDUFK3ULRULW\´The Wall Street Journal, 9 Jan 
*HRUJH:%XVK³+\GURJHQ)XHO,QLWLDWLYH&DQ0DNHµ)XQGDPHQWDO'LIIHUHQFH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http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/02/20030206-12.html (accessed 16 June 
2006).{{URL diverts to current White House Briefing Room. Do you have a URL for the 
Bush document?²here is the new URL: http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/02/20030206-12.html }} 
66 Chris Paine made this claim in his 2006 film, Who Killed the Electric Car?  
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of BEV start-up Tesla Motors.67 Sometimes referred to as an extended-range electric vehicle, the 
Volt was essentially a dual-mode hybrid utilizing a large and powerful battery. Whereas Tesla 
Motors equipped its Roadster with packs of lithium cobalt oxide electronics commodity cells, an 
expensive and problematic application of this technology, GM wanted a lithium battery pack 
designed expressly for electric traction.  
Once again, the company had to rely on external expertise. The results fell far short of 
expectations, in large measure due to the impulse to make perfection the enemy of the good. 
Chevrolet selected a lithium manganese oxide system developed by LG Chem over a less 
powerful but safer lithium iron phosphate system developed by Massachusetts-based start-up 
A123. A vindication of Thackeray¶VZRUN, this decision also validated U.S. federal science 
because the Volt battery pack used components licensed from Argonne National Laboratory.68 
Yet *0¶V quest for a super HEV delayed WKHFRPSDQ\¶V entry into the market by a crucial 
decade. Demand for the Volt was low in the recessionary late 2000s and early 2010s, and the 
                                                        
67 6HH.HLWK1DXJKWRQ³%RE/XW]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2007, http://www.newsweek.com/2007/12/22/bob-lutz-the-man-who-revived-the-electric-
car.html (accessed 8 Jan 2014). Lutz also claimed he had supported BEV technology as early as 
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advanced battery plant built with Obama administration stimulus money initially operated at well 
below capacity.69  
Moreover, the latest advanced battery packs offered nontrivial performance trade-offs 
that had serious implications for the marketing of electric vehicles. Lithium ion batteries were by 
far the most potent of all electrochemical power sources, boasting an energy density of around 
210 watt hours per kilogram by 2010.70 But they did not perform well in very cold or very hot 
weather.71 Lithium ion batteries also had short shelf lives, which represented an unprecedented 
hidden replacement cost, especially for large batteries worth a large fraction of vehicle value. 
And their well-known safety issues persisted. Responding to a spate of fires in 2013, Robert 
Huggins held that lithium ion batteries were inherently dangerous owing to their flammable 
organic electrolytes and propensity to produce oxygen at high voltage.72 For these reasons, some 
analysts predicted that massive recalls of lithium ion traction packs were all but inevitable.73 
                                                        
69 U.S. Department of Energy, Special Report: 7KH'HSDUWPHQWRI(QHUJ\¶V0DQDJHPHQWRIWKH
Award of a $150 Million Recovery Act Grant to LG Chem Michigan Inc. (Washington, DC: 
OAS-RA-13-10, 2013); %HUQLH:RRGDOO3DXO/LHQHUWDQG%HQ.OD\PDQ³*0¶V9ROW7KH8JO\
0DWKRI/RZ6DOHV+LJK&RVWV´Reuters, 10 Sep 2012, 
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ref. 3), 2615. 
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Electric Vehicles, vol. 2 (Warrendale, PA: SAE International, 2011), 3.  
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The equation of materials, technology, and industrial growth was a crucial (although by no 
means the sole) factor in the technopolitics of contemporary electric automobility. A way of 
knowing originating in academic and state research communities, it informed the construction of 
performance at every stage of the development of advanced power source technologies. It 
directed materials researchers in this context to seek substances yielding high power and energy 
density. Automakers later learned to exploit the resulting performance premium for their own 
agendas. Uncertain of the engineering and marketing implications of the commercial BEV, and 
resentful of state-mandated technological change, they made internal combustion performance 
the benchmark for battery electric performance, privileging the qualities of convenience, energy, 
and power over zero emissions and silent operation. 
The denouement spoke to the paradoxes of industrial-state relations in the global market. 
Automakers had united in arguing for super batteries as the necessary condition for super-electric 
vehicles, convincing CARB to roll back the ZEV mandate in exchange for research and 
development commitments. Unlike their American counterparts, however, Japanese automakers 
opened a lucrative market for hybrids equipped with the less-than-super NiMH battery, a system 
that combined reasonably high-energy density and modest lifespan with low cost and excellent 
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safety. Moreover, critics pointed out that heavy federal investment in lithium ion battery 
technoscience and industry almost exclusively benefitted Asian power source manufacturers.74  
Yet it was far from clear whether this commitment would translate into commercial 
success in the automobile sector. As ever, market-leading Toyota was circumspect. It embraced 
the lithium ion battery but did not believe that the technology proved the economic feasibility of 
the pure BEV. Along with Daimler-Benz, Toyota was content to take a stake in Tesla Motors and 
let the Bay Area start-up, its battery supplier Panasonic, and the U.S. taxpayer bear the financial 
risk of pushing the physical envelope of large, powerful battery packs. The majors purchased 
batteries and drive trains from Tesla Motors/Panasonic for use in experimental BEV fleets, but 
high costs and slow sales led them to liquidate their shares in this venture in late 2014.75 
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Wary of the manufacturing and marketing problems of BEVs, Toyota saw the hybrid 
electric as the future of electric automobility.76 To be sure, the company did intend to replace 
NiMH with lithium ion systems. When this project encountered technical difficulties in 2009±
2010, Toyota characteristically adopted a pragmatic approach. It retained the older, proven 
power source for the baseline Prius and used costlier lithium ion power for the plug-in version.77  
At the turn of the twenty-first century, electric drive had returned to public roads in the 
form of an ostensibly interim technological system.78 But the quest for the super battery for the 
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super-electric car remained a key justification of federal materials research.79 That this all-or-
nothing approach should have yielded so little for American industry to date reflects the 
remarkable persistence of the belief, despite all evidence to the contrary, that the benefits of 
national programs of science and technology necessarily accrued to domestic manufacturers. 
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